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THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION NORM
AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
MARKJ. ROE'
Industrial organization affects the relative effectiveness of the shareholder
wtalth maximization norm in maximizing total social wealth. In nations where
product markets are not strongly competitive, a strong shareholder primacy norm
fits less comfortably with national wealth maximization than elsewhere because,
where competition is weak, shareholder primacy induces managers to cut
production and raise price more than they otherwise would. Mere competition is
fierce, managers do not have that option. There is a rough congruence between
this inequality of fit and the varying strengths of shareholder primacy norms
around the world. In continental Europe, for evample, shareholder primacy
norms have been weaker than in the United States. Because Europe's fragmented
national product markets were historically less competitive than those in the
United States, their greater skepticism of the norm's value came closer tofitting the
structure of their product markets than did any similar skepticism here. As
Europe's markets integrate, making its product markets more competitive, pressure
has arisen to strengthen shareholder norms and institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
I make a single, simple point in this Article: the relative value of
shareholder wealth maximization for a nation is partly a function of
that nation's industrial organization. When much of a nation's
industry is monopolistically organized, maximizing shareholder
wealth would maximize the monopolist's profits, induce firms to
produce fewer goods than society could potentially produce, and
motivate firms to raise price to consumers beyond that which is
necessary to produce the goods.
I. SCOPE
A few words on scope: I do not specify here the source of
shareholder primacy norms. These norms could come from culture,
from institutions, or from rules. Nor do I focus on what does the
work: the norm or the underlying institutions and rules. I instead
focus on the fit between the norm (or its underlying institutions and
rules) and industrial organization.
Disentangling norms from practices is not easy. It would be odd
for a nation to have norms sharply differing from practices,
institutions, and laws. Because norms are usually congruent with
practices, institutions, and laws, knowing which element is critical is
hard.
Another limit to the paper: I have nothing here to say on the
absolute value of a shareholder primacy norm. It may be so critical
for organizing large private firms that even where it fits badly with
industrial organization, it is nevertheless worth pursuing. Or it may so
diminish total social wealth (a minority view today) that it is not worth
pursuing single-mindedly anywhere. Or it may be so brutal if pursued
single-mindedly that no organization and no society can absorb it in
its pure form. Perhaps the norm must be softened to survive. I
instead make the point that its relative value depends on industrial
I Cf Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1998) (analyzing how an
otherwise efficient rule might create social turmoil).
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organization and that there has been a rough congruence around the
world with this relative value.
II. THE UTILITARIAN BASIS FOR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXI'MIZATION
The prevailing academic and business view in the United States is
that shareholder wealth maximization fits with a utilitarian, greatest-
good-for-the-greatest-number philosophy. But would a nation with
concentrated industry be as well served by strong shareholder wealth
maximization institutions?
Shareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the
appropriate goal in American business circles.2 The norm makes
some uneasy, though: after all, why should shareholders, who usually
are favored members of their society, prevail over, say, current
employees, who usually are less favored?
The utilitarian justification is that this preference is the price paid
for strong capital markets, and allocative efficiency and that these
benefits are so powerful that they ovenvhelm the normative benefit of
any distributional favoring of current employees over current
shareholders. In the long run, the argument goes, employees and
other stakeholders are overall better off with fluid and efficient capital
markets, managers need a simple metric to follow, and both wealth
and, in the end, fairness are maximized by shareholders being the
corporation's residual beneficiary, with the other claimants getting
what they want via contract with the corporation. Current employees
might be made worse off in some industries, but employees overall
will have more opportunities, higher salaries, and better working
conditions. Furthermore, a stakeholder measure of managerial
accountability could leave managers so much discretion that
managers could easily pursue their own agenda, one that might
maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national
wealth, but only their own.
But that sketch is weaker in a nation with mostly concentrated
industry and weak product market competition. Enhancing
See, for example, the famous essay by Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33.
Although aggressive when it appeared, Friedman's perspective is now mainstream in
American business circles and was not unthinkable then (as it was in some other
nations). Cf Michael E. Porter, The Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Development,
in WoRLD ECONOMIc FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETrnvENEss REPORT 1998, at 38, 42
("In western Europe... the inability to place profitability as the central goal is... the
greatest constraint to economic development.").
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shareholder wealth maximization in that kind of a national economy
may, even if the baseline utilitarian argument is correct, reduce
national well-being, as we next see.
III. SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION AND MONOPOLY RENTS
A. Shareholder Primacy Could Diminish GNP if Industry Is Concentrated
Consider the monopolist's discretion. In Graph 1, a stripped-
down version of the basic supply-demand setting for a monopoly, the
monopolist can restrict production, raise price, and maximize its
monopoly profit by finding the price-quantity combination that makes
the "rectangle" (and, hence, its profits) as big as possible.
The monopolist could, if it wanted to, produce the amount that a
competitive industry would produce. If it did so, it would not be
maximizing its own wealth, because it would be leaving that
"rectangle" of profits on the table. The consumers' triangle would be
maximized. The monopolist would also, incidentally, usually employ
more people as production would rise compared to the constricted
production when monopoly profits are maximized. It would
maximize the nation's wealth, not its own.
A strong shareholder
wealth maximization
norm will induce the Pri.
monopolist's managers to
lower production, to raise cor,-r'
prices, and to lower surplus
employment. Weaker " (rcd)
shareholder primacy The Monopol 
sulus
norms could (plausibly (captured from Su\
but not necessarily) consume sl
increase national wealth /\ ndcmc
in a nation with highly
concentrated industry. Singe
W eaker shareholder ______pol___
primacy institutions could uaty
Graph 1: MonopolF. The Lost Consurners" Surplu,induce the firm to move and the Monpoksts' "Rectangle'
down the demand curve,
producing more and
lowering price. This point is consistent with a standard view on
agency costs: If unconstrained managers usually prefer to build larger
firms, if they usually prefer to build new factories, and if they usually
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prefer sales to profits-all of which are typically the core managerial
agency costs to shareholders-then they are more likely in a
concentrated industry with weak shareholder wealth maximization to
travel down the demand curve by first producing more and then
concluding that they cannot aggressively raise price. The weakly
controlled managers could produce more national wealth than the
tightly controlled ones."
To be sure, this increase in social wealth, while a plausible effect
of weakened shareholder primacy in a monopoly, is not its only
possible effect. Most obviously, loosening constraints on managers
may just mean that the managers take more for themselves rather
than increase production. One could, however, imagine a society with
weak shareholder primacy norms but strong antitheft institutions:
Managers are precluded from taking for themselves but are not
instructed as to what they can do with the potential pot of monopoly
profits. When incentives and markets are weak, they have discretion.
Even here there is ambiguity. In the United States, "managers taking
more for themselves" has led to higher salaries, more perks, and
bigger but less profitable empires, all of which have generally negative
social effects when product markets are competitive. But when
product markets are uncompetitive, the firm that expands to produce
more could be socially positive, assuming the empire is not an
unproductive one.
Conversely, managers on a short leash might stay at the same
point on the demand curve, but economize more on resources if the),
must maximize shareholder wealth. Economizing inputs tends to
offset the maximizers' reducing output. In an economy with
widespread monopoly, some firms encouraged to maximize
shareholder wealth would primarily economize, while others would
slash production and reduce allocative efficiency. One cannot predict
which effect would dominate.
More subtly, ex ante incentives would diminish if, after a
monopoly was acquired, institutions, rules, and norms weakened the
shareholders' profits. Which effects-the negatives of incentive
effects and managerial grabs of the rents or the positive of a better ex
post allocative efficiency-would dominate is a priori uncertain.
Hence, nations with concentrated industries and many monopolies
and oligopolies have reason to be less enthusiastic about, and
Cf THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 70-71 (1936)
(asserting that a "free hand" for managers would increase production).
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conceivably even to denigrate, shareholder primacy (depending on
which effects-incentives and reducing waste or allocative efficiency-
they predict would dominate).4 Historically, the ambiguous balance
was strongly in play in continental Europe where monopolies were
more widespread, but weakly in play in the United States where they
were less widespread.5
B. The Ambiguity of Pro-employment Corporate Governance Policies
Employees of monopoly firms can, and do, ally with capital to split
the rents, to facilitate constricting production and raising price, and
to seek barriers to competitive entry. That is, employees whose jobs
are already set and secure often represent themselves, not the whole
labor pool of all potential employees; some of those in that labor pool
could be employed but are not, or are employed in less desirable jobs
because the monopoly limits production and opportunity.
So, start here with the monopoly in Graph 1. Once the
monopolist's employees gain a secure share of that rectangle, they
become uninterested in policies that would move the firm down the
demand curve to a lower price with more production because that
would reduce the size of the rectangle (out of which the employees
4 The proposition can be stated more formally: Imagine Nation A, a nation with
competitive markets whose corporate law standard is that managers maximize national
wealth. In a shareholder suit, managers concede that they were not managing
shareholder profits. In Nation A's competitive market, they were therefore failing to
maximize not only shareholder wealth but also societal wealth. They should lose.
Imagine Nation B, a nation without competitive markets, where the corporate law
standard is that managers maximize national wealth. In a shareholder suit, managers
state that they filled to maximize shareholder wealth, but were maximizing the firm's
total sales, to the point where the revenues from the last sale equaled the costs of
making that sale. Under a shareholder primacy test, such managers would lose; but
under a national wealth test they would win. Below, I suggest that it may be no
accident that continental European nations have not had a strong shareholder
primacy standard. Infra Part IV.5 C .
In the longer run, this antishareholder story as creating wealth weakens. This is
because such antishareholder societies can eventually deter private savings, and a
savings decline would affect overall welfare. (Ironically, such antishareholder wealth
maximization would be socially satisfactory in the short run but not in the long run.
The irony comes from the usual clich6 that maximizing shareholder profits is a short-
run strategy.) More precisely, consider an economy in which the competitive rate of
return on capital was 10%, and the monopoly initially yielded 30%. If the
antishareholder institutions only halved profitability in the monopoly industries,
capital would still be forthcoming because politics still left the competitive rate of return
on the table. But if politics took profitability below the competitive risk-adjusted 10%,
savings would diminish and capital would take flight to other less antishareholder
nations.
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get some of their higher-than-typical wages and benefits) and, in turn,
would thereby put downward pressure on the employees' wages and
benefits. This much is understood. 6
But consider the consequences of a supply shock to the industry.
The cost of a critical input-oil, for example-rises dramatically.
Usually the shape of the demand curve induces the monopolist to cut
production further and lay off employees. That is, if a cost rises, the
monopolist will often pass it, or most of it, along to the consumer by
raising prices, cutting production, and laying off some workers.7
Consider the monopolist in a nation that denigrates shareholder
wealth maximization and has rules and norms that discourage layoffs.
Employees cannot easily be laid off. Their jobs cannot be radically
reconfigured without their consent. Thus, the monopolist might not
cut production and raise prices further, despite the shareholder-
wealth-maximization basis for doing so, because it must pay the
employees anyway if labor markets are rigid and if it cannot costlessly
redeploy its workforce." In such circumstances, not only are the
employees with jobs protected, but national wealth is increased (or at
least not decreased) by slack agency controls on managers. A weak
shareholder primacy norm facilitates greater production and, here,
greater allocative efficiency. (To be sure, prior to the monopoly
arising, employees withjobs at the potential monopoly firms would like
the firm to have monopoly profits because then they can share in
some of the rents. In this post-monopoly setting, they prefer that
some of the monopoly profits be dissipated on keeping themselves
employed. Ex post and ex ante attitudes to the monopoly results
differ.)
This is not just an abstract possibility. Detailed industry studies
show that when German and American firms faced exchange rate
pressures, German firms absorbed the cost, that is, shareholders
. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose, Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the
Trucking Industry, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1146, 1148, 1175 (1987) (finding that union
workers in the trucking industry gained part of the rents from weak competition).
Cf Kim B. Clark, Unionization and Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits, Growth
and Productivity, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 893, 898-99 (1984) (noting that greater industrial
concentration allows a monopolist to pass union wage increases forward to
consumers).
One could consider this scenario to be shareholder wealth-maximization inside
constraints. But this scenario can play out in two ways: labor rules might constrain the
owners from laying off the workers or corporate laws and institutions could weaken
shareholder wealth maximization. The first is shareholder wealth maximization within
constraints, the second is not.
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shouldered the loss. Similar American firms passed it on, thereby
risking that their higher prices would lead them to lay off employees
and downsize, that is, employees bore more of the risk." Presumably
the American firms did not absorb these costs because they were in a
more competitive market and could not absorb the increased costs.
C. Why Not Both?
One could imagine a nation seeking shareholder wealth
maximization within constraints. That is, the nation's polity might
constrain firms from laying off employees, but within those bounds, its
rules and norms could allow or even encourage firms to maximize
shareholder wealth in the belief that maximizing it will economize on
resources and promote national wealth after basic fairness is assured.
This combination is uncommon for at least three reasons. First,
maximizing within constraints does not necessarily maximize social
wealth when product competition is weak;' some public policymakers
may understand this." Second, bright-line fairness and job security
constraints are often hard to write down in a law and enforce since the
boundaries are hard to define: When are layoffs justified? When are
they unjustified? Who judges when they are justified? Weak
shareholder wealth norms and institutions plausibly could better
operationalize the core goals of such a society that sought to favor
employees. Third, political parties that constrain the firm (with pro-
employee rules) often have complementary antishareholder
ideologies; protecting jobs in place and denigrating shareholder value
are an ideological (and public choice, interest group) package;
political parties seek both, not one or the other, and, if a party
achieves power, it implements both.,2
9 Michael Knetter, Price Discrimination by U.S. and German Exporters, 79 AM. ECON.
REV. 198, 205 (1989); cf Michael A. Salinger, Tobin's q, Unionization, and the
Concentration-Profits Relationship, 15 RAND J. ECON. 159, 166 (1984) (concluding that
either "there is little long-run monopoly power in the U.S. economy" or any such
power is captured by an industry input such as unionized labor).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
High monopoly rents throughout the economy create two related cross-cutting
effects: First, the potential for agency costs in the monopoly firms rises because the
pot of monopoly money is up for grabs. Owners react by seeking to contain the profit
loss, often keeping concentrated ownership because they cannot trust managers when
monopoly profits make agency costs very high. Second, public policymakers who are
looking out for the broad public have little reason to foster shareholder wealth
maximization institutions.
12 One could similarly imagine less-competitive nations trying directly to force
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D. Proviso: Who Pays for That Transferred Rectangle
and That Lost Triangle?
Thus far I have focused on market structure in a national
economy. In such a setting, shareholder wealth maximization norms
and supporting institutions may decrease national wealth because the
monopolist seeking to maximize profits would destroy more consumer
value than the one with weak profit goals. For some small nations,
however, the relevant consumer pool (whose wealth the monopolies
are reducing) is not domestic but international.
So, now change our assumption of monopoly firms selling into a
domestic market. Assume that the monopolistically organized
industries export heavily to neighboring nations. Then some portion
of the monopolist's rectangle comes from foreigners and some part of
the diminished consumer's surplus triangle is lost to foreign
consumers. If the policy choice is binary, the locally rational decision
is to maximize monopoly profits at the expense of foreign buyers.
Shareholder wealth maximization is not general wealth maximization
(because foreign buyers are made poorer), but it is local wealth
maximization.
IV. DELIBERATELYWEAKENING SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
Corporate governance institutions tend to match the underlying
organization of industry. Some of these institutions are legal, some
economic, some cultural. A few examples follow of the differing
strength of shareholder institutions.
monopoly firms to increase production. This they sometimes do, but usually via
government ownership of the firm or via price regulation. Antitrust policy obviously
pla)s a role here: when successful in anchoring competition (perhaps because the
underlying conditions in the economy facilitate success), shareholder primacy can play
a larger role.
The point here is not that the antishareholder authorities are crisp in their
thinking and policies. (And shareholder wealth maximization norms and institutions
are also denigrated in nations with highly competitive markets, although denigrated
less vociferously.) I do not think that public players have rigorously thought through
the relationship, although a few surely have the intuition. The point is more that weak
shareholder norms fit, and perhaps are less likely to be challenged, in a weak
competition environment.
, Sometimes the local monopoly can price discriminate by charging the
monopoly price internationally and a lower price domestically.
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A. Corporate Law's Standards
Section 2.01 of America's core academic aspiration for corporate
law tells the firm's managers: "a corporation... should have as its
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing
corporate profit and shareholder gain."4  The analogous corporate law
commands in continental Europe differ.15  French corporate law
allows managers, it is said, to manage their firm in the social interest."
German law refuses to tell managers that they are their shareholders'
agents. This tendency has been part of a long tradition of refusing to
endorse shareholder primacy,17 and Germany has labor strongly
represented on the large firm's supervisory board. Indeed, German
commentators (more authoritative there than are U.S. commentators
here) state that German directors cannot act "'only in the interests of
the shareholders.""8 The fit of the differing national corporate law
standards with the product market analysis thus far is obvious.
I do not mean by this that corporate law's instructions to
managers determine what they do. The means by which managers
can undo this instruction are many: the American business judgment
rule vests them with enormous, nearly unreviewable discretion;
monetary incentives, if lacking, could overwhelm any of law's
rhetorical instructions; and America's corporate law itself has more
14 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01 (a) (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (emphasis
added).
15 Philippe Bissara, Les viritables enjeux du dbat sur 'le gouvernement de l'entreprise'
[The True Stakes of the Debate on 'Corporate Governance], REVUE DES SOCIETES, Jan.-Mar.
1998, at 5, 15 (stating that, in France, as in most continental European nations, the
social interest is the directors' compass (quoting Alain Viandier, Professor of Law at
the Universit6 de Paris V)).
16 French law, judges, and CEOs use [the notion of 'social interest'
differently]. The judges [use it] to guarantee the continuity of the firm,
especially when [it] faces economic difficultie, [while] the CEOs refer to it to
keep a free hand in managing the company. Shareholders see [it] as [an]
ambiguous [notion,] mostly used against their own interest.
Christane Alcouffe, Judges and CEOs: French Aspects of Corporate Governance, 9 EUR. J.L.
& ECON. 127, 127 (2000).
17 See Klaus J. Hopt, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe, in THE
COMING TOGETHER OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAw 106, 118 & n.52 (Basil S.
Markesinis ed., 2000).
is Arndt Stengel, Directors' Powers and Shareholders: A Comparison of Systems, INT'L
Co. & COMMERCIAL L. REV., Feb. 1998, at 49, 51 (1998) (quoting Michael Hoffmann-
Becking, Aktiengesellschaft in MfONCHENER HANDBUCH DES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS,
tome 4, § 33 n.3 (1998)).
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than a little undertow via its authority to account for ethics") and, in
reaction to hostile takeovers, to account for stakeholder
constituencies. International differences in corporate law's standards
are the beginning, not the end.
B. Rhetoric and Culture
The rhetorical pressure goes beyond law. Norms in American
business circles, starting with business school education, emphasize
the value, appropriateness, and indeed the justice of maximizing
shareholder wealth (which will trickle down, or raise the tide that will
raise all boats, etc.). In France and Germany, shareholder wealth
maximization is demeaned and seen as at odds with social values. And
in Japan, senior managers rank shareholder profit maximization
(more precisely: return on investment and stock price) much lower
than do American managers."'
Well-to-do families in some nations are said to prefer family
ownership of enterprise. Firms are passed from generation to
generation; corporate govemance sometimes becomes the governing
of family relationships. While this cultural preference may well be a
fully independent dimension to the organization of business and
politics, note the fit between this cultural preference and high rents.
The preference is "functional" (for shareholders) in that such family
structures can keep more of the rents inside that family than can
another structure. It can be seen as a natural reaction when
shareholder wealth institutions are weak, making a separation of
ownership from control more precarious for shareholders than when
the, are strong. (Or, reversing causality but keeping the fit: weak
shareholder primacy institutions may fit when ownership is close
anyway, as the dominant stockholders can look out for themselves.)
An American culture of a founder's quick sale of her successful firm
fits better with an economy with few rents (and with stronger
1" See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 14, § 2.01(b) (2)-(3) &
rep. note 5.
Merton J. Peck, Thw Large Japanese Corporation, in THE U.S. BusINEss
CORPORATION: AN INSTITUTION IN TRANsON 21, 33-37 (John R. Meyer &James M.
Gustafson eds., 1988). The Japanese managers' pursuit of other goals could still result
in adequate profit maximization. Cf Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton,
Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36
J. FIN. ECON. 225 (1994) (finding that appointments of outside directors increase with
poor stock performance or earnings losses); Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executives, Turnover
and Firn Pr formance in Germany, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 142 (1994) (exploring similar
relationships in Germany).
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shareholder primacy institutions and norms).
C. Hostile Takeovers
In the 1980s, about thirty percent of America's Fortune 500
companies received takeover bids.2' This is an extraordinary number,
indicating that shareholder power via takeover bids had to be on the
minds of all large firm managers. The 1980s were also, consistent with
the thesis here, arguably one of the periods of strongest product
market competition. Not only were American manufacturing markets
workably competitive, but international competition was, for
essentially the first time, pounding every manufacturer that could not
perform. Hostile takeovers were, and despite the rise of the poison
pill still are, an engine of shareholder wealth maximization.
In Europe until recently, hostile takeovers (and indeed any
takeovers) were denigrated. The few hostile takeovers tried in
Germany foundered (until the Vodaphone takeover in 2000), often
due to political pressure, as workers campaigned to block the
takeovers and politicians sided with employees and against the capital
owners. 22 In one major attempt, in the steel industry, the nominally
conservative German Chancellor said he was "'deep[ly] concem[ed]"'
over it, asking the firms and players to "'live up to their social
responsibilities. '' 2 3  They substantially cut back their planned
restructuring.
The French Minister of Finance has been suspicious of high-
priced takeovers because, he said when deterring one such high-price
offer in 1998, the "'high [stock] price means the buyer would have to
look immediately at higher profits to pay for the acquisition, which
21 John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations? 24J. CORP. L. 837, 851 (1999).
2 See Richard Halstead, Steel Is Put to the Sword, INDEPENDENT" (London), Mar. 23,
1997, at 3 ("The combined forces of federal economics minister Guenter Rexrodt and
Johannes Rau, premier of North Rhein Westphalia, Germany's biggest state, bounced
Germany's virtually sole corporate raider into 'negotiations' with Thyssen [for a
smaller merger on terms favorable to incumbent employees.]"); Steeled for a Battle, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 22, 1997, at 9 (reporting a mainstream German newspaper
headline asking if an executive seeking a takeover wanted to set Germany on fire);
Michael Woodhead, A Pyrrhic Victoy for Germany, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 30,
1997, § 3, at 7, col. 1 ("The foiling of Krupp's bid for Thyssen is a victory for the social
consensus.").
23 William R. Emmons & Frank A. Schmid, Universal Banking Control Rights, and
Corporate Finance in Germany, FED. RES. BANK ST. LouIs REv., July/Aug. 1998, at 19, 22.
(quoting German Chancellor Helmut Kohl).
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could be negative... forjobs.' '2 1 Until the late 1990s, the state often
decided takeover results and, even when it withdrew from overall
control, it continued to seek to avoid takeovers that would yield "a
social massacre" with "massive layoff[s]." 2" The French ministers
proposed a takeover law in March 2000 that would require an offering
company to agree on some terms with the employees of the target. "A
takeover could not succeed without taking into account employees'
views," said the French Finance Minister, seeking to formalize what
had been an informal policy.26
Only recently, as European governments have been moving to the
right economically and product markets have become more
competitive, have hostile offers appeared; historically they occurred in
continental Europe at a rate far lower than that prevailing in the
United States.
D. Incentive Compensation
Stock-based incentive compensation could induce managers to
maximize shareholder wealth. Studies of incentive compensation
show that French, German, Italian, Swedish, and other continental
European managers receive lower incentive compensation than
American managers and that the incentive compensation they do
27receive is typically a much smaller fraction of their total pay.
Stock options have been less widely used in Europe. Partly this
has been because stock options were disfavored in tax terms, and
presumably much of this tax result came from an antishareholder
perspective. Stock options have also been disfavored because options
would further separate managers from employees, something that
European culture sees as having an unethical edge.28
Al Man Katz, Shareholders Gain Voice in France, but Socialist Tradition Talks Back; WALL
S . J., Feb. 13, 1998, at B7E (quoting French Minister of Finance, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn). A high price might indicate high inefficiencies, perhaps including
redundancies in the work force.
Z. Martine Orange, La fin de l'exception francaise? [The End of the French Exception?],
LE MONDE, Mar. 30, 1999, at 19.
Frderic Pons, Un bnin d'thique dans les fusions [A Bit of Ethics in Mergers],
LIBERTION, Mar. 16, 2000, at 25; see Thomas Kamm, French Bill Takes Aim at Takeovers
In Wake of Recent Merger Battles, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 16, 2000, at 2 (describing the
takeover bill).
7 ToxwERs PERRIN, WORLDWIDE TOTAL REMUNERATION 24 (1999)
-Se Peter Goldstein, Managers & Managing Compensation Packages for Executives
Awn't All Alik-Base Pay Converges in Europe, but Bonuses and Stock Options Vary, WALL
St. J. EUR., Dec. 22, 1998, at 4 (noting that in some countries, "options aren't
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V. CAN STRONG CAPITAL MARKETS EASILY OVERCOME
WEAK PRODUCT MARKETS?
One might think that capital markets must induce shareholder
wealth maximization even if product markets are weak. This is
incorrect, however.
A simple explanation is that the two tend to move together, so
disjunction (one strong, the other weak) is an odd result. But even if
capital markets are strong and product markets weak, capital markets
probably would not trump the weak product markets and induce
strong shareholder results.
A. Raising New Capital
Capital markets' constraints on managers are weaker when
product competition is weaker. Consider how capital market
competition constrains managers: Managers must go to capital
markets for funds and, when they do, stock-buyers penalize poorly
performing managers by demanding a higher rate of return and a
lower stock price; creditors penalize those managers by demanding a
higher interest rate; and at the limit, capital-providers refuse to give
those managers any new capital. In the latter case, the firm withers.
More effective firms with more effective managers eventually replace
it.
But the capital market constrains the monopolist's managers less
strongly than it constrains a competitive firm's managers. Often the
monopolist's managers can generate sufficient profits internally to pay
for needed capital improvements. And as long as they leave some of
the monopolist's "rectangle" on the table for the original capital
providers, the monopolist's return on invested capital will still be higher
than that of a competitive firm. Capital markets constrain the
monopolist's managers strongly not when the managers are
dissipating any monopoly profits, but when the managers go further
and dissipate so much that the return dips below the competitive return for
capital29 Until then, managers are constrained only weakly by capital
considered entirely ethical"); see also Graham Bowley, Hoechst Launches Stock Option
Scheme, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 13/14, 1997, at 19 ("Only a handful of Germany's
biggest companies have adopted share option schemes, which differ from those in the
US and UK because of strict German regulations on employee share ownership.").
29 The capital markets mechanism would, in textbook fashion, be this: When the
firm goes fully public, investors will capitalize the firm's expected cash flows. These
cash flows will be the competitive return, plus the additional monopoly profits before
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markets.
Thus, if the monopoly rate of return is, for example, 30% when
worldwide capital markets demand a 10% rate of return (for this type
of company, this class of risk, etc.), then capital market constraints
might strike the finn dead if managers throw away enough that the
expected return declines below 10%. But capital markets will not
directly constrain the managers as they take, share, or squander 20%
of the monopoly's return. That 20% cushion is the monopolist's
rectangle, the potential excess profits that create the potential for
slack.
B. Takeover Markets
Takeover markets constrain managers, but they do not do so fully.
Even when they add to constraints on managers, they do not
substitute fully for competitive markets.
Consider the typical premium in takeovers, which approximates
50% of the pre-takeover trading price of the stock. Posit that
competitive markets ordinarily keep managers from straying more
than 25% away from maximizing shareholder profitability. That
would mean that when markets are uncompetitive, there is an
additional 25% of slack in shareholder wealth that managers are
accorded, before takeovers kick in to constrain them from further
straying from shareholder profitability. More plausibly, we have a
series of overlapping, but partial constraints; removing one increases
the slack in most, although not all, firms. For some firms, takeover
markets constrain as strongly as does product market competition,
making each substitute for the other. But for other firms one
constrains more strongly, such that loosening the stronger constraint
does cut managers more slack.
Moreover, these same societies that have weak product market
agency costs, minus the monopoly profits lost due to agency costs. The original owner
reaps the expected gains from the monopoly and any expected losses from managerial
agency costs. Unexpected reductions in agency costs will be captured by future
shareholders. And if the potential agency costs are high for a monopoly firm, then the
original owner will often decline to allow the firm to go public to avoid the expected
loss.
So, if the competitive rate of return is 10%, but the firm earns S30, not $10, on its
investment of S100, the original owner will be able to sell the firm for S300, if agency
costs would be nil. If agency costs would diminish earnings to $25, then the original
owner will be able to sell for $250. If the original owner values the gains from going
public (in diversification, liquidity, change of work plans, etc.) at less than $50, he or
she will keep the firm private.
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competition have reason to be reluctant to facilitate those takeovers,
which would tighten up shareholder profitability, plausibly inducing
higher prices and lower production. Many of these countries have
discouraged takeovers. °
C. Capitalization of Monopoly Profits
Capital markets will bid up the stock price until the return equals
the risk-adjusted competitive return. Posit that the competitive, risk-
adjusted rate of return is 10% annually. In competitive industries,
$100 of investment will return $10 each year. A monopolist builds,
with a $100 investment, a monopoly that yields $30 annually. When
the monopolist sells the firm to buyers who expect the monopoly to
be retained, the buyers will pay $300. The original monopolist
captures the $200 "rectangle." If agency costs are expected to
diminish the firm's profitability to $25 (i.e., leaving $15 of monopoly
profits for capital-providers but dissipating the other $5), then
outsiders will pay $250 for the firm, and the original monopolist can
capture only $150 of the "rectangle."
True, managers in these now diffusely held firms have the usual
reasons to want to increase the firm's profitability from $25, to the $30
level that is attainable. They might do so. But capital markets do not
necessarily force them to: The managers can raise capital, if they
need to, so capital markets' strongest weapon does not punish them.
The typical 50% takeover premium needed means that an outsider
would probably not mount a takeover (even if the society allows one),
because the slack onlyjustifies a 20% premium.31
VI. THREE AMERICAN IMPLICATIONS
One: American shareholder primacy institutions-always more or
less strong--strengthened further when competition intensified in
recent decades.
30 See supra Part IV.C.
31 A third theoretical capital market constraint is worth mentioning: When the
monopolist leaves the firm, she could conceivably capitalize the firm (nearly) entirely
with $300 of debt, with an expected return of $30. Cf Michael C.Jensen, Agency Costs
of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323 (1986)
(explaining that, according to the "control hypothesis" for debt creation, managers are
constrained by the reduction of free cash flow resulting from the issuance of debt).
The constraint on managers is that they must then scramble to meet the interest
payment of $30. To do so, they must capture the monopoly profits.
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Two: What if the American economy is changing? What if
monopoly, say in new technologies, is becoming more widespread?
There is a trade-off, as there is for patents and monopoly analysis
generally, of ex ante incentives versus ex post allocative efficiency. If
markets are competitive, there is good reason to weight ex ante
incentives much more heavily than ex post allocative efficiency. And
we weight ex ante incentives heavily in the United States-for
example, patent protection for twenty years. But we do give ex post
allocative efficiency something on the scale: the patent after all does
not go on in perpetuity. Some of this ex ante incentive versus ex post
allocative trade-off may, if monopoly once again becomes important,
spill over into debates about shareholder norms. When even patent-
holding monopolies face some, albeit weak, competition, the trade-off
in favor of ex ante incentives is easier to make than when the ex post
allocative costs are very high.
Three: although I have here focused on one relationship-high
monopoly rents fit less well with shareholder primacy than does a
competitive product market-there is much more to the analysis:
high rents also affect politics and corporate structure through other
channels.
First, they affect corporate structure by raising managerial agency
costs. They raise managerial agency costs because there is more for
managerial agents to lose for shareholders, and several constraints on
managers-product market constraints, obviously, but also usually
capital market constraints-are weaker in monopoly settings.
Moreover, employees and other stakeholders increase their demands
on the firm, managers could more readily accede because the pot to
divvy up is bigger, and these demands should further raise managerial
agency costs. This pressure on the public firm via heightened agency
costs helps to explain why there were fewer public firms in continental
Europe. And, because the United States has historically been more
competitive, it might help to explain the (relatively) easy time the
public firm had in developing in the United States. As Europe's
product markets have become more competitive, its demand for, or at
least tolerance of, shareholder primacy institutions has also increased.
This tolerance has made the public firm more plausible than it was
previously.
Second, these rents can affect political structures. Conflicts in
divvying up those monopoly profits can be widespread in a nation
where monopoly is widespread. If widespread, these conflicts can spill
over into politics, fuel political ideologies and political parties, and
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privilege quick government-led conflict resolution so that production
can go forward. When an economy's product markets are more
competitive, these conflicts diminish. Hence, the consequences of the
conflict-political spillover, ideologies, and high demand for means
that reduce conflict-also diminish.
I further develop these effects of high monopoly rents on the
corporation and on disfavoring the diffusely owned public firm (by
12raising managerial agency costs) elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
Maximizing shareholder wealth where competition is weak,
therefore, could plausibly reduce production, raise prices, and lower
national wealth, especially if managers when unconstrained value
production, sales, and expansion over shareholder profits, as
American agency-cost analysis usually concludes. (Or, because
shareholder wealth maximization norms and institutions also induce
economizing on resources and other positive incentives, where
competition is weak, the norm does not raise production as much,
does not lower price as much, and does not raise national wealth as
much as it does where competition is strong.)
Hence, where industry is weakly competitive, shareholder wealth
maximization norms and institutions are relatively less effective in
raising social wealth than they are in more competitive economies."
And it would be a mistake to conclude that strong capital markets can
trump weak product markets: if there is a worldwide return
demanded by fluid capital at, say, 10%, then the monopolist who can
potentially earn 30% has 20% of slack to keep for itself, to squander,
or to share with other players in the system. The strongest capital
market constraints do not kick in until the monopolist's managers
squander, steal, or give away two-thirds of its profits.
Europe has tended both to have been less competitive historically
and to have had weaker shareholder primacy norms and institutions
than the United States has had. American shareholder primacy
institutions-never especially weak in the first place-strengthened
considerably as product market competition became more severe in
recent decades. And in continental Europe, where national
32 MarkJ. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 539 (2000); Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001).
33 At least in the short, and maybe the medium, run. See supra note 5.
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economies tended to have industry much more concentrated than it
was in the United States and where pro-shareholder institutions
tended to be denigrated, their weak shareholder institutions fit with
their product market structures." Whether or not Europe's past of
social democratic, antishareholder ideologies and institutions were
wealth-maximizing (or the degree to which they were) depends on
how the trade-off was made between gains from higher production
and losses from more slack (ex post in weak controls and ex ante in
weakened incentives), and on how uncompetitive its product market
structure was.
M If information technologies create natural monopolies in the United States in a
wide patch of the economy, the tight American fit of strong product competition and
strong shareholder institutions could change. Cf Paul Krugman, Unsound Bytes? i, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 4, at 15 ("The inevitability of monopolies in a knowledge
economy ... creates new puzzles for antitrust policy. The Microsoft case poses real
dilemmas, and it is surely only the first of many.").
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